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For anyone troubled by the prevalence of abortion in our society,
Roman Catholic moral theology is likely to appear inviting. And,
indeed, it would be hard to deny that, from the normative perspective
of one who is deeply disturbed by an easy acceptance of abortion,
Catholic moral theology has prove9 far more satisfactory than most
Protestant ethical reflection . 1 In limiting permissible abortions to
cases where life conflicts with equal life, Catholic thought, though
unacceptable to many in our society, will be congenial to the Protestant who also believes that fetal life is human life and that all human
lives are entitled to equal respect. Yet, the Catholic position on abortion, relying as it does on the difficult concept of indirect killing and
the related double-effect category, presents the Protestant (not to
mention others) with certain problems. Furthermore, in suggesting
that even in certain conflict cases we must simply stand aside and
permit nature to take its course, Catholic moral reflection runs contrary to some of our most fundamental intuitions and seems to consider insufficiently the fact that the "nature" we know is disordered
and cannot simply be equated with "creation" as it comes from the
hand of the Creator.
On the other hand, the great advantage of Catholic teaching concerning abortion is that those interventions which it does countenance
are strictly limited to a carefully circumscribed set of cases - thereby
avoiding the danger of justifying far more than we originally intended.
The Protestant, if he foregoes concepts such as indirect killing and
double effect, is in danger of finding no way to limit the death-dealing
blow to a circumscribed set of cases where life conflicts with equal
life . It is not surprising therefore to see that Paul Ramsey, the Protestant ethicist who has written most effectively against abortion,
should have adopted double-effect as a way of articulating what (he
thinks) Christian love requires .2 Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether
a Protestant position can be developed which will both dispense with
double-effect categories and at the same time provide some of the
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limitations on abortion which Catholic moral theology has offered. In
this paper I will suggest the outlines of such a Protestant position.3
Though the Catholic position, having developed over centuries, is in
some ways enormously complex, I will concern myself only with what
seem to be the essential elements. At its core, it seems to me, the
Catholic position achieves two things: 1) it affirms the equal value of
every individual human being and, therefore, the right of every human
life to protection; 2) it finds a way (by means of the concept of
indirect killing) to permit intervention in some but not all cases of
parity conflicts of life with life. What is important - and deserving of
great respect - is the way in which 1) and 2) are held together in a
coherent position. Those interventions which are permitted are understood in such a way that they do not call into question the fundamental premise (equal respect for human lives) on which the position
is based. I am suggesting that an appropriate Protestant position would
be one which accepted 1) but found a substitute for 2) - a substitute
which would permit us to intervene in all (not just some) conflict
cases but which would, like the Catholic position, countenance no
intervention except in parity conflict cases.
I

The first element in the Catholic position really grows out of several
beliefs which are, or ought to be, common Christian affirmations. All
human life comes from God, is endowed by Him with worth and
dignity, and ought therefore to be respected and protected.
The affirmation that all human life comes from God is connected to
the imperative enjoining equal protection of all human lives by the
rule which St. Thomas describes as the fundamental natural law: do
good and avoid evil. This imperative, combined with a belief that life is
God's gift, requires that we both seek to preserve life and refrain from
direct killing of innocent life . Nevertheless, this fundamental natural
law actually involves two precepts : "do good" and "avoid evil." And
there is a sense in which the second of these has priority over the first. 4
We are to do all the good we can, but that means all the good we
morally can. It is conceivable, in other words, that certain acts which
are intrinsically evil (and which therefore violate the precept " avoid
evil") might, at the same time, benefit our fellows (and therefore
fulfill the precept "do good"). Should any such case arise, Catholic
moral theology has traditionally maintained that the negative precept
takes precedence over the positive. We cannot do evil that good may
come of it. We are to do all the good we morally can, not simply all
the good we can.
A similar point has sometimes been made in terms of the distinction
between duties of perfect and imperfect obligation. Duties of perfect
obligation (like the negative precept) always bind. Duties of imperfect
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obligation (like the positive precept) enjoin us to act in certain ways
but do not specify the precise circumstances under which we are to do
so. Hence, my duty to be beneficent to my fellows is a duty of
imperfect obligation. It enjoins certain action but permits me to
decide the times and places in which I will carry out my beneficence.
On the other hand, a duty of perfect obligation always binds in all
circumstances - e.g., the duty to refrain from inflicting needless suffering.
Suggestion on Doing Good
The suggestion that we are to do all the good we morally can is
sometimes made not by stressing that negative precepts take priority
over positive or by explicating the distinction between duties of perfect and imperfect obligation, but by distinguishing between moral
and physical evil. To say that we cannot do evil that good may come
of it is not to say that we could never cause certain physical evils in
order to achieve some good effects. It is moral evil which cannot be
done even for the sake of achieving certain good effects. The difficulty
the Protestant almost instinctively feels with this distinction is that it
inevitably strikes him as an attempt to "keep our hands clean" and
refrain from sin even if the price is also refraining from service to the
neighbor. I want to suggest, however, that something like this distinction ought to be part of any serious Protestant ethic and that it can be
correctly understood. To say that (moral) evil cannot be done even in
order to achieve (physical) good simply means in this context that the
precept "avoid evil" retains its priority. The Protestant may still feel
that formulating the distinction in terms of moral and physical evil is
unnecessarily (and unbiblically) dualistic and that it ignores the connection of a physically disordered creation with human sin. Nevertheless, I think we may put the distinction in quite acceptable ways.
In order to do this I will begin by drawing on several examples
taken from the British moral philosopher, Philippa Foot. 5 She suggests that we consider the following two cases and ponder our reactions to them:
1) You are the driver of a runaway railroad engine. You can steer
only from one narrow track onto another, no other options being
open to you. On one of these tracks five men are working, and on the
other one man is working. What should you do?
2) You are a judge faced with rioters demanding that a culprit be
found for a cerlain crime. The rioters have taken five hostages whom
they threaten to put to death unless the culprit is punished. Since the
real culprit is unknown, it is suggested that you frame one innocent
person, thereby saving the five hostages and having to execute only
the one innocent man. What should you do?
Intuitively we are likely to think that in case (1) we ought to steer
toward the track where only one man is working but that in case
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(2) we ought not frame one innocent man in order to save the five.
Yet, in both cases we might say that the consequences are the same
- the numbers certainly are . Why think that five ought to be saved in
case (1) and not also in case (2)?
Foot suggests that we distinguish between positive and negative
duties (which is nothing more, really, than her way of distinguishing
the two halves of the injunction to "do good and avoid evil"). Negative duties enjoin us to refrain from injuring other persons in a
variety of ways. Positive duties enjoin us to bring aid, also in a variety
of ways. Foot's crucial assertion, which is in agreement with the
description of Catholic moral theology given above, is that if a negative and a positive duty conflict, the negative duty has the stronger
claim upon us.
This distinction helps to show what is at stake in our differing
intuitions with respect to Foot's two examples. In case (1) we have a
conflict between negative duties - harming either one or five men. In
such a circumstance, Foot thinks we can do little more than save the
larger number of men. But in case (2) we have a conflict of a negative
with a positive duty - the duty to refrain from injuring the innocent
man and the duty to bring aid, if we can, to the five hostages. In such
a case the negative duty has, according to Foot, the stronger claim
upon us. We ought always, of course, try to bring aid if we can. But, as
we have seen, that means "if we morally can," and the violation of a
negative duty is not an acceptable means to choose for fulfilling a
positive duty. This may help us to see that it is not simply a question
of permitting physical evil in order to avoid moral evil - a formulation
which seems semantically to smack of protecting our moral purity and
keeping our hands clean, or which suggests that physical evil is totally
unrelated to our moral failure. Instead, we can see that we are simply
trying to understand the relation between several kinds of moral obligations. The agent is not simply attempting to retain his moral uprightness. Rather, he is asking what fidelity to our various neighbors and
their claims upon us would require.
We can apply the distinction to the matter of abortion and then
consider what theological backing we might offer in support of Foot's
philosophy and our intuitions. By distinguishing negative from positive duties and giving greater moral weight to the former we can, it
seems, limit permissible abortions to eases of conflict of life with
equal life. We will have to refrain from injuring the fetus in order to
assist family planning projects (even those of relatively impoverished
families, who certainly ought to be aided in other ways which do not
violate negative duties); we will have to refrain from injuring the fetus
in order to satisfy a whim of the mother, even one grounded in an
alleged right to privacy; and so forth. In all such cases the duty not to
harm the fetus will take precedence over our other obligations to bring
both serious and trivial aid to others involved.
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Furthermore, it is possible to provide some theological warrant for
this sort of distinction. Why is it that negative duties should carry
greater moral weight than positive duties? It is, I suggest, because from
the perspective of Christian theology moral agents must always be
viewed as creatures. The creature is one who understands his life and
action in terms of a story God is telling, a story which begins in the
primeval creative utterance and which will one day, having reached its
appointed conclusion, end. Only the Author of the drama is in a
position to specify clearly the ultimate significance of the roles which
particular creatures are called upon to play.6 Only He may fully see
how the various roles make up a coherent whole. The creature who
plays his role may be very uncertain of its final significance or importance; he may even be uncertain whether the story is now in its final
chapters or whether the plot is really just beginning to get off the
ground. In short, the creature is not responsible for the whole of the
story or for all the consequences of his action. Rather, he is responsible for playing well the role allotted him. C. S. Lewis has put the
point well, by appealing to another story.
In King Lear (III:vii) there ia a man who is such a minor character that
Shakespeare has not given him even a name: he is merely 'First Servant.' All
the characters around him - Regan, Cornwall, and Edmupd - have fine
long-term plans. They think they know how the story is going to end, and
they are quite wrong. The servant has no such delusions. He has no notion
how the play is going to go. But he understands the present scene. He sees
an abomination (the blinding of old Gloucester) taking place. He will not
stand it. His sword is out and pointed at his master's breast in a moment:
then Regan stabs him dead from behind. This is his whole part: eight lines
all told. But if it were real life and not a play, that is the part it would be
best to have acted. 7

Distinction Anti-Consequentialistic
Foot's distinction, like the traditional Catholic view, is an anti-consequentialist position, and I am suggesting that understanding what it
means to be a creature provides some warrant for this. Our duty as
creatures is not necessarily to achieve the best consequences in general, but to act out with fidelity the responsibilities given us. To say
that certain things ought not be done even in order to achieve what
seem to be good consequences is to say that the creature is responsible
for doing all the good he morally can, not all that he can. To understand ourselves as creatures is to believe that we ought not step out of
the story and think of ourselves as author rather than character. We
are not to orchestrate the final denouement; we are simply to be
responsible.
It is a measure of how much this Christian story has lost its hold on
our consciousness that many today might be horror-stricken by any
counsel which suggests that we think of our responsibility in terms
which limit it. But, of course, (as anyone who knows the Christian
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story can attest), this is not an attempt to evade guilt; rather, it is an
attempt to understand ourselves as what we are : creatures, not the
creator; characters, not the author. It may be that we cannot understand ourselves in such a way (and limit our action accordingly) apart
from faith that the Author of the story knows what He is doing and
can bring it to a successful completion. Within the terms of the story,
a situation which seems to invite us to give greater weight to a positive
than a negative duty is to be viewed as a temptation - an inducement
once again to view ourselves as gods and to try to take into our own
hands the course of the story and unlimited responsibility for the
consequences of our action.
That kind of unlimited responsibility ought be accepted by no one
except God. Perhaps, of course, the story will turn out all wrong and
the consequences will be deplorable. That is the risk we take as we live
in hope. Within the confines of the story, however, that possibility
must be understood, not as a call to moral agents to take over the
Creator's responsibility, but as a temptation to believe that God either
cannot bring off what He has said He can or does not want to. It
raises, in short, either the old problem of evil or a straightforward
temptation for faith. But in either case, our first recourse ought not be
to revise our judgment about what moral agents, understood as creatures, can rightfully do. There is good theological reason to support
Foot's distinction between negative and positive duties as well as her
belief that, in a conflict between the two, negative duties take priority. This should, indeed, be part of what it means to call ourselves
creatures.
II

Thus far I have simply tried to make clear why we ought to affirm
that human lives not in conflict be protected from direct attack, even
if the cost of doing so is the sacrifice of other goods. But what of cases
where life conflicts with equal life? This brings us to the second element in the traditional Catholic position, to the related concepts of
indirect killing and double effect. It is not, after all, clear how, granting what has been said in the previous section, intervention would be
justified even in such conflict cases. When one life conflicts with
another, both are still human lives. Each is still our "neighbor" - one
whose very presence among us calls out for respect and protection.
And it seems quite patently true in such cases that in order to serve
one neighbor we must turn against the well-being of the other. This
seems to be the structure of a genuine conflict situation: We must
either (a) serve neither neighbor; or (b) turn against the well-being of
one of the conflicting lives. It is, in other words, a situation in which
doing good seems to entail doing evil, thus creating an incoherence in
the fundamental moral law.
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Foot's example which I used above, tends to overlook this fact for a
very simple reason . The case of the runaway railroad engine (Le., an
analogue to a permitted killing case) is one in which the agent is
already in action and can do nothing to avoid killing either one or five
persons. He cannot stop. Non-intervention is not a possibility for him.
But it is always a possibility in cases where the lives of mother and
fetus come into conflict. It is always possible to "do nothing" and
permit nature to take its course. Paul Ramsey has suggested that we
are faced with three alternatives in such cases of conflict: 1) we can
remain equalitarian (i.e., valuing both lives in conflict equally) and
stand aside; 2) we can abandon equal regard and intervene in order to
preserve the life we consider of greater worth; 3) we can remain equalitarian but nevertheless intervene by reasoning in double effect
categories. 8
Any Protestant - indeed, any Christian - who affirms the "alien
dignity" of every human being is not likely to be attracted by the
second of these options. We appear, then, to be left with the options
of non-intervention or double effect. I will suggest later that Ramsey
has not exhausted the possibilities, but for now let us consider the
traditional Catholic response, a response which Ramsey wishes largely
to uphold.
In such conflict cases, Catholic thought has tried to find a way to
do good (intervene) while at the same time avoiding evil (refraining
from directly attacking innocent life). Obviously, this is not going to
be easy. If we truly value these two lives in conflict equality, it is
difficult to see how we could intervene to protect one against the
other. The solution offered has been that of "indirect killing." A
well-known example of a case in which intervention has been permitted is that of a pregnant woman whose uterus is cancerous. In such
a situation, it is claimed, the intervention is targeted upon the cancerous uterus. Removal of it is the direct intention of the act. The death
of the fetus, though foreseen and permitted, is nevertheless not
approved and not intended. In other words, in such an intervention,
one act is carried out, but it is an act with a double effect (removing
the cancerous uterus; killing the fetus). The evil effect is not embraced
as part of the agent's plan. It is possible to describe the intervention in
such a way that the agent's plan of action (his aim) can be seen to be
saving the life of the mother by a means which, as it happens, also
involves indirectly killing the life of the fetus .
At the same time, we can consider another case in which intervention
could not, it would seem, be justified on these traditional grounds.
Consider the case, alluded to by Paul Ramsey, of an induced abortion
necessary as a first step toward dealing with a case of misplaced, acute
appendicitis (in which the pregnant woman's appendix will rupture if
the fetus is not aborted so that the physician can get to the appendix).
Such an intervention would not fit the paradigm of indirect killing. 9
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For here we have really two distinct acts, the first of which kills the
fetus and is a means toward the second, which deals with the threat to
the mother's life. In such a case it is difficult to claim that we have not
embraced the death of the fetus within our aim. To permit such an
intervention, then, would seem to involve doing evil that good may
come of it or, in Foot's terminology, violating a negative duty for the
sake of a positive duty.
Distinctions Between Interventions
Thus, intervention would be permitted in the case of the cancerous
uterus but not in the case of the misplaced, acute appendicitis. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to agree with Ramsey when he writes that a
distinction between these cases "would not be confirmed by common
sense or intuitive moral judgment." 10 Unfortunately, though, the
same might be said of Ramsey's attempt to save double effect categories by suggesting that in the second case we permit the intervention
by understanding the intention of the doctor's action to be not killing
the fetus but, rather, incapacitating it from doing what it is doing to
the life of the mother.ll That comes dangerously close to making the
concept of intention a "waxen nose" which we may twist and tum as
we feel necessary. While approving Ramsey's intuitions we may well
wonder whether we can deny that intervention in such a case would
necessarily imply that the death of the fetus had been incorporated
into our plan of action. Elizabeth Anscombe suggested that it was
"nonsense to pretend that you do not intend to do what is the means
you take to your chosen end."12 That is, for me at least, too strong.
It is not nonsense, as Ramsey's careful discussion demonstrates,_ but
still, it is far from being a persuasive re-description for the simple
reason that it seems too obvious an attempt to save a theory which is
in deep trouble. The human act of doing is here understood too
exclusively in terms of intention divorced from the physical structure
of the act.
The comparison of these cases points to the two major problems
which the Protestant (as well as many others) is likely to feel with the
concepts of indirect killing and double effect. If we try to permit
intervention in all such conflict cases, we will stretch the notion of
indirect killing beyond recognition and enmesh ourselves in a veritable
semantic bog through which the Protestant urge toward simplicity
seeks to cut. If, on the other hand, we adhere to a straightforward
notion of what double effect permits, we will simply have to recognize
that in some conflict cases, it will be evident that we have really left
ourselves with non-intervention as the only remaining alternative.
What we need is a perspective which will permit us to intervene in all
(not just some) parity conflict cases but which will not countenance
intervention except in conflict cases.
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III

I suggest that a justification for intervention in conflict cases, which
is different from any of the three alternatives Ramsey describes, is
possible. Helmut Thielicke has suggested that in such conflict cases we
come face to face with the disorder sin brings to nature, not with an
unblemished creation reflecting perfectly the will of its Creator. And
he further maintains that in such cases "we grant to medical assistance
the mission to set forth in a signlike (though admittedly imperfect)
way God's real will for the world and allow it to be a reminder of the
original perfect creation and a promise of the world to come." 13 That
is, we are to give expression to our belief (and our hope) that the
heavenly Father is a loving, not an indifferent, Father - one who does
not hesitate to involve Himself in our radically disordered world.
Thielicke's point might be put in this way: in a conflict case we
must either serve neither neighbor or tum directly against the wellbeing of our neighbor. But to serve neither neighbor is inhuman in a
specifiable sense. It is at least a necessary condition of a genuinely
human relationship that it be characterized by giving and receiving. It
is our task to shape "natural" events in such a way that they are
humanized - are, that is, characterized by at least some giving and
receIvmg. To require non-intervention makes it impossible so to
humanize a case where life conflicts with equal life. (Obviously , it
would be very different should the mother freely offer herself on
behalf of the child. In that instance the relationship would be clearly
and dramatically characterized by such giving and receiving.) The
requirement of non-intervention in parity conflict cases involves,
therefore, an indifference to our human condition, a willingness to
accept a relationship which has not yet risen to the personal, human
level. If we understand this, we can also see why abortion ought to be
permitted in cases of rape, even though these are not conflict cases in
any normal sense. For they are (almost paradigmatically) cases which
exemplify what is inhuman - a relationship totally devoid of any genuine giving and receiving. Here again, the woman whose personhood
has been violated might nevertheless choose to wrest some human
significance from her tragedy by carrying the child to term and offering to bear the burden which this involves. But to require her to do so
would once again make it impossible for giving and receiving actually
to transform the situation.
What we have then is a justification of intervention in conflict cases
which proceeds not by assuming it is permissible (as Foot does), not
by moving to categories of double effect and indirect killing, and
(contra Ramsey's suggestion as to the possible alternatives) not by
ceasing to affirm the equal worth of fetus and mother. It is only after
he has justified intervention - as a means of witnessing in a signlike
way to the real will of God, or, we might say, a means of humanizing a
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natural event - that Thielicke goes on to discuss the possibly penn issible balancing of the fetus' life against that of the mother. That
balancing, however, is not involved in the justification of intervention
per se. It occurs only in the course of deciding whom intervention
should save, having detennined on other grounds that such intervention is morally pennissible. Conceptually, the two decisions are kept
separate.
We now have the outlines of an acceptable Protestant position. It
would, like Catholic moral theology, limit intervention to cases where
life conflicts with equal life. This would be done by means of the
distinction between positive and negative duties, grounded in a recognition of our creaturely condition, and done in a way which would
make it clear semantically that we are not engaged in any attempt to
preserve our moral uprightness. It would, unlike Catholic moral
theology, permit intervention in ' all parity conflict cases, recognizing
the need to inject at least some element of giving and receiving into
these tragic cases in order to bear witness to God's own love. It would
also permit intervention in cases of pregnancy resulting from forcible
intercourse, on the grounds that the continued presence of the fetus
incarnates the inhuman violation, not just of the woman's body, but
of her person; and that, as in the traditional conflict case, we cannot
rest content in acknowledging a situation entirely devoid of human
acts of giving and receiving. The justification of pennitted interventions would proceed free of the semantic difficulties which beset the
concept of indirect killing and free of the prevailing tendency to
engage in estimates of comparative worth of human lives. This position seems in many ways a desirable alternative.
IV

One problem remains. Earlier we characterized the core of the Catholic position as involving two essential elements: 1) an affirmation of
the equal right of every human life to protection; and 2) justification
of indirect killing in some (but not all) cases where life conflicts with
equal life. Much of the strength of this traditional position lies in its
coherence. The interventions permitted in (2) are pennitted in a way
which does not call into question premise (1) on which the position
was founded. Direct killing is always proscribed, in accord with the
first element of the position. The killings pennitted under the second
aspect of the position are only those which can be understood to be
indirect. Coherence is maintained though, as we have seen, at the
possible cost of either losing our way in a semantic bog or acquiescing
in non-intervention in certain cases (and thereby refusing to transfonn
a disordered creation by infusing some element of giving and receiving
into natural events). But there is at least coherence, no small virtue.
Can the same be said of the alternative I have proposed? If intervention is permitted in order to bear witness in a disordered world to the
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Creator's real will for His creation, what is there to prohibit us - on
occasions other than actual cases of parity conflict between lives from violating negative duties in order "to set forth in a signlike
(though admittedly imperfect) way God's real will for the world"?
Have we, in other words, justified intervention in terms which might
permit it also in other cases which, though they manifest the disorder
of a sinful world, are not themselves instances where life conflicts with
equal life or situations in which there remains no other way to be
humanly present in acts of giving and receiving? There may, after all,
be many circumstances in life which, though they do not so dramatically manifest the disorder of a sinful world and are not totally
devoid of possibilities for giving and receiving, are nevertheless far
from exemplifying God's real will for the world. Would it be permissible to violate negative duties in order to improve such situations? If
it were permissible, the two halves of my suggested position -limiting
intervention to conflict cases only; justifying it in all such caseswould prove incoherent. We would be forced back to a choice between (a) non-intervention; and (b) simply weighing magnitudes of
evil (i.e., calculating consequences).
It may help us to appreciate what is at stake theologically if we
back off for a moment from the problem of abortion and consider a
different problem in medical ethics. In his seminal work, The Patient
as Person, 14 Paul Ramsey has a chapter in which he discusses ethical
considerations involved in the self-giving of vital organs. The bulk of
the chapter, which cannot be adequately summarized here, consists of
an examination of Catholic and Protestant justifications for such selfgiving. Catholic justifications, all versions of a principle of totality,
rely on some benefit believed to accrue to the donor. Any such justification of organ donation will, of course, have to be a principle of
totality which takes into account the spiritual and moral well-being of
the donor. The donor is permitted to sacrifice an organ and injure his
physical well-being for the sake of his total personal welfare - the
fulfillment which this act of giving will bring him.

On the other hand, "a possible justification of organ transplantation
from living donors that might be developed within the ambit of
Protestant ethics would rest the matter upon charitable consent alone;
the benefit aimed at would be the benefit to the recipient, not the
donor's own higher wholeness." 15 Thus, Ramsey seeks to justify
organ donation by appeal to the self-giving spirit of Christian love
(agape). Having done this, however, he immediately confronts a problem. To stress agape alone lends tremendous pressure to appeals for
medical intervention to help someone in need. Such a justification of
self-giving may, Ramsey writes, "precisely because of its freedom from
the moorings of self-concern, be likely to fly too high above concern
for the bodily integrity of the donor." 16 At this point, he suggests,
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physicians will have to "save us from the moralists" and remain the
" only Hebrews." This is Ramsey's somewhat poetic way of saying that
it will never be sufficient to speak of agape alone. Such talk, in isolation, will be unable to limit pressures for intervention (pressures to
"do good"); indeed, it will intensify such pressures. Rather, we must
make clear that ours is always to be a creaturely love. There is a very
fine line - but a crucial one - which separates genuine creaturely love
from a love which soars too high and forgets its created dependence.
And an agape which does soar too high, in thus forgetting its creaturely moorings has, in fact, become sin. Indeed, it has been subtly transmuted into that primal sin: pride. So fine is the line which divides
creaturely love from a renewed attempt to be like God .
What I have been suggesting in this paper is that something similar
happens when we attempt to construct a Protestant position concerning
abortion. We find ourselves pulled in two different directions. On the
one hand, when we consider the limits which our creaturely condition
places upon us, we seem driven to prohibit intervention. For we, after
all, are only creatures. The good we are to do is only the good which
can morally be done. We do not author the whole story. When, on the
other hand, we take seriously the call to let our life be shaped by the
self-giving love of Christ, the pressures to intervene - to testify to God
as One Who is loving, not indifferent - become intense. An incoherence seems driven into the very heart of our position.
To put it this way helps us to see what is at stake theologically and
why it is that incoherence must be risked and both halves of the
position maintained. We would be mistaken - theologically mistaken - to choose either (a) non-intervention; or (b) simply weighing
magnitudes of evil. Neither would do justice to the full character of
human relationships. The former would divest such relationships of
the giving and receiving necessary to raise them to the human level.
The latter would ignore the limits of our creaturely responsibility. We
need to do justice to creation and redemption; both parts of the
story God is telling must shape our action. If we cannot bring about a
perfectly coherent fit between the two, that is perhaps not surprising.
It is, rather, almost what we should expect of people whose status is
that of pilgrims - people who find themselves in the midst of the
story, often unable to discern its direction of movement, its total
significance, or how the Author will manage to weave the many
threads of the plot together in such a way as to resolve seeming
incoherence.
We therefore have a theological reason not to permit ourselves to be
overtaken by "foolish consistency." We need to justify intervention in
parity conflict cases lest our witness seem to be to an indifferent
rather than a loving Father. For in these cases there is no other way to
bear witness to God's real will for His creation, no other way to infuse
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some element of giving and receiving into the natural event. At the
same time there are good reasons for limiting intervention to just such
cases. As sinful creatures we are always tempted to soar too high, to
try to be as gods, and to take final responsibility for the whole of the
story. It is important that we limit our interventions in such a way
that we remain human and creaturely.17
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